The critical deterioration of conditions in the agricultural sector caused by the suspension of vessel calls at Ukrainian Black Sea ports requires an urgent response. According to forecast calculations, without immediate decisions, the port blockade will rapidly lead to a liquidity crisis, a reduction in sown areas, and the loss of production capacity in the coming season.

Taken together, the challenges currently facing the agricultural sector are significantly more dangerous and severe in their consequences than even those of 2022. At that time, the halt of deep-water ports was gradually offset by the growth of Danube, rail, and road routes, made possible through the active support of neighbouring countries, while the drop in purchase prices was cushioned by the relatively low cost of agricultural production. Today, however, a new wave of maritime export blockage is compounding an already damaged port and overall logistics infrastructure, critically low water levels on the Danube, restricted access to the EU market, a shortage of drivers, and the high cost of key production inputs – fuel, fertilizers, plant protection products, and wages have risen by 50–60% over the past year and a half, while world prices for agricultural products have remained unchanged.

According to available calculations, in the 2026/2027 marketing year, the production of major grain and oilseed crops may amount to approximately 81.37 million tonnes: grains – 62.76 million tonnes, sunflower – 11.54 million tonnes, soybeans – 3.78 million tonnes, and rapeseed – 3.28 million tonnes.

Even under a conservative estimate of domestic consumption at up to 18 million tonnes, approximately 67 million tonnes of agricultural products would need to be directed to export, i.e., an average of 5.6 million tonnes per month. Even before the blockage of sea ports, Ukrainian agricultural exports were already in a state of latent logistical crisis, as actual average monthly logistics throughput in the 2025/2026 marketing year amounted to only 4.1 million tonnes per month.

If this pace were maintained, annual exports in the 2026/2027 marketing year would total only approximately 49 million tonnes, i.e., approximately 18 million tonnes below the estimated export requirement. This is an optimistic forecast, since ongoing enemy attacks continue to destroy infrastructure and reduce the capacity of Ukrainian ports to handle agricultural products. Moreover, the fact that carry-over stocks exceed the “normal” level by 3.5 million tonnes indicates that the export requirement already exceeded actual capacity in the previous year.

Consequently, the mere restoration of sea port operations to the average level of the past year will not, by itself, resolve the crisis. It will only reduce its depth and postpone the terminal phase, in which part of the already harvested agricultural production will be lost due to exceeding possible storage periods. Without the restoration and expansion of port handling capacity, the agricultural sector will remain in a situation of planned surplus accumulation and a long-term decline in domestic purchase prices, and, accordingly, the planned unprofitable operation of most agricultural enterprises – leading to a wave of mass bankruptcies in the sector and, consequently, a large-scale reduction in production. If the port blockage continues and no emergency support measures are introduced, the crisis will materialize within the coming months and will disrupt the 2026 autumn sowing campaign and even partly the 2026 harvesting campaign, not to mention the 2027 spring field campaign.

Under the scenario of a sea port shutdown, the available export and handling capacity in August 2026 is estimated at only 1.7 million tonnes per month, of which 1 million tonnes relates to exports by rail. Even with a gradual increase in alternative logistics to 2.8 million tonnes by June 2027, these volumes remain substantially below the required average monthly export pace and do not allow for avoiding the accumulation of surplus stock within the country.

However, even achieving this level of exports appears problematic given the low water level on the Danube, accumulated damage to Danube port infrastructure, continued shelling, and the spread of attacks on vessels heading to these ports. It should be recalled that the peak level of exports through the Danube ports in 2022 was 2 million tonnes per month, and this was achieved under considerably more favourable circumstances.

Under these conditions, the monthly export shortfall relative to requirements is projected at 3.9 million tonnes in August 2026, gradually decreasing to 2.8 million tonnes by June 2027, provided the enemy does not succeed in blocking the Danube ports. Under a pessimistic scenario, which does not assume an increase in their throughput capacity, a sea port blockage lasting 4 months would result in an additional production surplus of approximately 9.6 million tonnes, and over 6 months – 14.4 million tonnes, which would need to be added to the 18-million-tonne surplus already projected due to insufficient handling capacity even if maritime shipping continues. Thus, depending on when maritime shipping is restored, an estimated 27.4–32.4 million tonnes of excess agricultural production will continue to put pressure on the market throughout the next marketing year.

Following the blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, a significant share of grain traders suspended purchases, and the market experienced a sharp decline in prices, including a one-day drop of UAH 800 per tonne for wheat. As of 23 July, demand prices for Class 3 wheat at Greater Odesa ports stood predominantly at USD 185–200/tonne CPT-port, and in some cases at USD 178/tonne, whereas at the port of Constanța the same crop was quoted at USD 218–223/tonne DAP. On 24 July, prices for wheat and rapeseed – crops currently being actively harvested – continued to fall sharply, by UAH 500–1,000/tonne per day and more, with prices in some cases recorded at UAH 7,000/tonne, i.e., around USD 160/tonne. This is already below full production cost, and the price decline is not stopping.

According to available calculations, the cash requirement for field campaigns amounts to approximately UAH 367 billion per year, of which UAH 111 billion relates to the autumn campaign and UAH 255 billion to the spring campaign. If the port blockade continues, the funding shortfall for the autumn field campaign will amount to at least UAH 62 billion.

The total agricultural bank loan portfolio as of June 2026 amounts to approximately UAH 161 billion, of which 45.2% relates to the “Affordable Loans 5-7-9%” Programme; in frontline regions, dependence on this programme reaches nearly 100%. The estimated volume of agricultural loans due to be repaid within the next 12 months amounts to approximately UAH 65 billio

Thus, the agricultural sector is rapidly heading toward a crisis of unprofitable production, which will have a negative multiplier effect on the entire economy. The wave of bankruptcies it causes will, in turn, trigger a banking crisis. The decline in production and exports will reduce foreign currency earnings (already being observed), and will hit local budgets, as well as suppliers of fuel, fertilizers, plant protection products, seeds, and machinery, road hauliers, and JSC “Ukrzaliznytsia.”

To address these challenges, the following anti-crisis measures are proposed:

• Introduction of a separate preferential credit limit for replenishing working capital for the 2026 autumn sowing campaign, with an indicative amount of up to UAH 118.40 billion and interest rate compensation.
• Introduction of a mechanism for the extension and restructuring of existing agricultural loans due for repayment in 2026–2027, with repayment schedules linked to the actual restoration of exports and the receipt of export proceeds.
• Provision of state or portfolio guarantees of up to 80% of the loan amount for loans for the autumn sowing campaign and for the extension of existing obligations.
• Recognition of seasonal agricultural loans for replenishing working capital as a high-priority area within the “5-7-9%” Programme, with a sufficient limit for small and medium-sized producers.
• Elimination of the application of the modified interest coverage ratio criterion, as one based on 2025 financial reporting indicators that does not reflect current realities.
• Urgently conduct an assessment of damage to the port infrastructure of Greater Odesa and the Danube ports, determine the actual handling capacity of each transport route, and introduce continuous monitoring of their current condition.
• Identify the list of critical port, rail, and border logistics facilities whose restoration or modernization would deliver the fastest increase in export capacity, including after the resumption of maritime shipping, and establish a priority framework for their financing and implementation.
• Ensure funding for the emergency repair, restoration, and modernization of cargo handling capacity through state budget allocations, international assistance, credit lines from international financial institutions, and other sources not prohibited by law.

The situation requires immediate decisions. This is not a matter of an ordinary seasonal deterioration in market conditions, but a risk of disruption to the production cycle in one of the key sectors of the Ukrainian economy. The rapid restoration of export logistics and temporary liquidity support will make it possible to preserve production, employment, the tax base, and the state’s foreign currency inflows.